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Abstract—Password-authenticated identities, where users es-
tablish username-password pairs with individual servers and
use them later on for authentication, is the most widespread
user authentication method over the Internet. Although they are
simple, user-friendly, and broadly adopted, they offer insecure
authentication and position server operators as trusted parties,
giving them full control over users’ identities. To mitigate these
limitations, many identity systems have embraced public-key
cryptography and the concept of decentralization. All these
systems, however, require users to create and manage public-
private keypairs. Unfortunately, users usually do not have the
required knowledge and resources to properly handle their
cryptographic secrets, which arguably contributed to failures of
many end-user-focused public-key infrastructures (PKIs). In fact,
as for today, no end-user PKI, able to authenticate users to web
servers, has a significant adoption rate.
In this paper, we propose Password-authenticated Decentral-
ized Identities (PDIDs), an identity and authentication framework
where users can register their self-sovereign username-password
pairs and use them as universal credentials. Our system provides
global namespace, human-meaningful usernames, and resilience
against username collision attacks. A user’s identity can be used to
authenticate the user to any server without revealing that server
anything about the password, such that no offline dictionary
attacks are possible against the password. We analyze PDIDs
and implement it using existing infrastructures and tools. We
report on our implementation and evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite all drawbacks that passwords introduce, they dom-
inate as the default user authentication method in computer
systems [12], [13]. User identities are usually expressed as
usernames (sometimes extended to e-mail addresses) and
are authenticated with passwords. Usernames and their cor-
responding password-related information are shared with a
server upon registration. Then to authenticate, a user sends its
username-password pair to the server which checks whether
the pair matches the registered record. Such identities are
local (to the server), but single sign-on systems, such as
OpenID [46], extend them allowing once registered identity to
be reused ‘globally’ for authenticating to other servers without
a need of creating a new identity for these servers. Although
convenient for users, such identities have significant limita-
tions. Most importantly, they are controlled by their providers
(i.e., the servers that have registered them). Thus, a user who
should be an owner of its identity has to trust that the server
operator manages (and will manage) the identity appropriately.
Moreover, systems like OpenID, allow identity providers to
undermine users’ privacy by learning which websites and
when users are connecting to. Finally, the currently dominating
password-based authentication method requires users to send
their passwords in plaintext, making them prone to various
attacks.
To provide better security guarantees and enable new
applications (like signatures), public-key infrastructures (PKIs)
were introduces, where dedicated trusted authorities verify
identities and assert bindings between them and their public
keys in digital certificates [19]. Identities in these systems are
human-meaningful and global (usually based upon DNS), but
their security relies on a set of globally trusted authorities
and the security of the namespace they express identities in
(i.e., DNS). In past, we have witnessed multiple attacks on au-
thorities that resulted in impersonation attacks on high-profile
websites [38], where a trusted authority could easily ‘collide’
an identity by simply creating a new certificate. To eliminate
globally trusted authorities, the idea of distributed PKIs were
presented [48]. In so called, web-of-trust PKIs [1] users create
peer-to-peer trust assertions and make trust decisions basing
on them. An important disadvantage of distributed PKIs is
that they either still rely on DNS or express identities in local
namespaces, thus cannot be used universally. Self-certifying
identifiers [41] propose names that are cryptographically-
derived from public keys. Such a namespace is global and se-
cure, but generated names are pseudorandom, thus it is difficult
to memorize and use them by human beings. The limitations
of all these systems led to an observation, usually referred
to as Zooko’s triangle [58], and a related informal conjecture
that no naming system can simultaneously provide human-
meaningful, global, and secure names. Although it is believed
that naming systems built upon blockchain platforms [39], [53]
refute this conjecture, these systems require to associate names
with public keys. Therefore, similar to other PKIs, they rather
target servers which, unlike end-users, are more likely to have
resources and knowledge to manage their cryptographic keys
appropriately.
In this work, we remove the above limitations by proposing
Password-authenticated Decentralized Identities (PDID). Up
to our best knowledge, it is the first identity and authen-
tication framework which allows users to establish human-
meaningful and global password-authenticated identities that
are also resilient to collision attacks. We instantiate PDIDs
with a combination of a) a blockchain platform offering con-
fidential smart contracts, able to store and process users’ data
privately, yet providing a global namespace, and b) a modified
password-authenticate key exchange protocol, authenticating
users without revealing, even to servers, a password or any
information enabling offline dictionary attacks against the
password. We present PDIDs in the client-server setting, where
a user authenticates to the server with its username-password
pair, however, the scheme can be extended to other models
and applications. We discuss the security of our framework
and present its implementation and evaluation.
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II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the used notation and crypto-
graphic tools (Section II-A), briefly describe password authen-
tication and a protocol we base upon (Section II-B), as well
as we introduce the concept of confidential smart contracts
(Section II-A).
A. Notation and Cryptography
Throughout the paper we use the following notation
• G denotes a group of order q with generator g,
• r R←− S denotes that r is an element randomly selected
from the set S,
• fk(m) is a keyed-pseudorandom function that for key
k and message m outputs a pseudorandom string from
{0, 1}n,
• H(m) and H′(m) are cryptographic hash functions that
for message m output values from {0, 1}n and G, re-
spectively,
• AEnck(m) is an encryption algorithm of an authenticated
encryption scheme, that for key k and message m outputs
the corresponding ciphertext c,
• ADeck(c) is the corresponding decryption algorithm, de-
crypting the message m from the ciphertext c given the
key k, or failing with incorrect input,
• Gen() is a public-key generation algorithm, returning a
private-public keypair 〈sk, pk〉,
• PEncpk(m) is a public-key encryption algorithm, that
produces ciphertext c for the given public key pk and
message m,
• PDecsk(c) is the corresponding public-key decryption
algorithm, recovering the message m given the ciphertext
c and the corresponding secret key sk, or failing with
incorrect input.
B. Password Authentication
Passwords have a particularly long history as a means of
authenticating users to computer systems [13]. Despite their in-
herent limitations and drawbacks, they are surprisingly robust
to any techniques that try to disrupt them [12]. Password-based
authentication on the Internet is dominated by the following
method (or its slight modification):
• Registration. The user registers its identity by providing,
via a secure channel, a username U and a password
pwd to the server. The server selects a random salt
s
R←− {0, 1}n and stores the following mapping1
U : 〈s,H(s, pwd)〉.
• Authentication. To authenticate to the server, the user
sends its username-password pair 〈U, pwd′〉 to the server,
which identifies the mapping, and checks whether
H(s, pwd′) ?= H(s, pwd).
1The purpose of adding a random salt is to mitigate offline dictionary attacks
possible after the server’s storage is compromised (i.e., with randomized
password hashes, an adversary would need to precompute a dictionary per
salt, what is memory- and computational-hard). Although other constructions
are possible, the combination of salt and hashed concatenation of salt and
password is the most common one.
Despite its popularity and wide-spread adoption, this proto-
col has a major flaw since in every authentication the password
is sent in plaintext. This limitation requires a secure channel
between the parties for each authentication, but even then, it
makes passwords vulnerable to multiple attack vectors (like
server-side malware).
To address this limitation, Bellovin and Merritt [7] pro-
posed the first password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
protocol, where two parties can securely establish a high-
entropy secret key from the memorable password they share.2
Since then, there have been proposed multiple PAKE protocols
with various efficiency and security properties [16], [25], [33],
[59]. Most of those protocols do not allow an adversary to
learn the password or any information allowing her to run
offline dictionary attacks against the password. However, they
require either to send salt in plaintext (facilitating offline
precomputation attacks3) or to store effective passwords by
servers (allowing adversaries to instantly compromise all pass-
words after the server’s compromise). Only recently, Jarecki
et al. proposed OPAQUE [30], a PAKE protocol that removes
these issues and introduces low transmission and computation
overheads. OPAQUE bases on the oblivious pseudorandom
function (OPRF) defined as follows
Fk(m) = H(m, (H
′(m))k). (1)
To register, a user sends to the server its username-
password pair 〈U, pwd〉. (Only this transmission requires a
secure channel between the parties.) The server, after receiving
the request, computes the following
ks
R←− Zq; k ← Fks(pwd); ps R←− Zq;Ps ← gps ;
pu
R←− Zq;Pu ← gpu ; c← AEnck(pu, Pu, Ps);
and saves 〈ks, ps, Ps, Pu, c〉 as the password metadata corre-
sponding to the username U .
After the registration is complete, the user can use its
credentials to authenticate to the server. In order to do so,
the user computes
r
R←− Zq;α← (H′(pwd))r;xu ← Zq;Xu ← gxu ;
and sends U,α,Xu to the server. Upon receiving this message,
the server computes
xs
R←− Zq;Xs ← gxs ;β ← αks ;
and sends β,Xs, c back to the user who then computes
k ← H(pwd, β1/r); 〈pu, Pu, Ps〉 ← ADeck(c).
Now, the user (with pu, xu, Ps, Xs), and the server (with
ps, xs, Pu, Xu) can run a key exchange protocol, like
HMQV [35], to establish a shared symmetric key.
2We note that with an already establish secret key, the user can easily
authenticate to the server.
3An adversary, knowing a username-salt pair, can prepare a dedicated
dictionary targeting this user that can be used immediately after compromising
the server.
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C. Confidential Smart Contracts
Blockchain platforms, initiated by Bitcoin [44], combine
append-only cryptographic data structures with a distributed
consensus algorithm. They allow to build highly-available,
censorship-resistant, transparent, and verifiable systems min-
imizing trust in third parties. Initially, they were proposed
to implement distributed and immutable transaction ledgers
(also called blockchains) that enable peer-to-peer payments.
Over time, in addition to those application-specific systems,
smart contract platforms have emerged. They allow anyone
to deploy code with any logic (implementable in a supported
programming language) and interact with this code over the
blockchain platform, benefiting from availability, censorship
resistance, or supported cryptocurrency tokens.
The transparency of blockchain platforms can also be
seen as an important disadvantage. Recording all (plaintext)
transactions in a public ledger, inevitably limits the applicabil-
ity of those platforms to privacy-demanding applications and
users. The community seeing this limitation quickly proposed
private payment-specific blockchains, however, designing a
platform for confidential smart contracts turned out to be
a more challenging task. Only recently we have witnessed
some promising proposals combining distributed consensus
with cryptographic tools (like commitments, multi-party com-
putation, or zero-knowledge computation integrity proofs),
to achieve confidentiality in smart contracts [8], [14], [34],
[40]. Unfortunately, as for today, all these platforms introduce
significant efficiency bottlenecks, effectively prohibiting the
deployment of sophisticated smart contracts.
Another family of solutions, with a more practical focus,
are blockchain platforms that leverage a trusted execution
environment (TEE) [15], [17], [18], [28], [49], [60]. The TEE
technology, usually realized with Intel SGX [29], a) allows to
run code within secure enclaves which cannot be compromised
even by the system operator, b) facilitate remote attestation,
able to prove which enclave code is running on a remote ma-
chine, and c) offer sealing which enables enclaves to encrypt
their secret data and to deposit it on untrusted storage (the data
can be recovered subsequently by the enclave that protected it).
This toolset, together with a consensus protocol (guaranteeing
the consistent view of a global distributed ledger), allowed
to provide high-performant and confidential smart contracts,
where contracts and their data, as well as all transactions,
stay private, despite being ordered, validated, and recorded
on a public ledger. For instance, Brandenburger et al. [17]
extend Hyperledger Fabric [4] by confidential smart contracts.
In their architecture, they distinguish two types of enclaves:
one responsible for verifying the blockchain state integrity,
and another for executing actual smart contracts confidentially.
Nodes can join the system by conducting remote attestation
and signing up to a special enclave registry. For each created
smart contract, a dedicated keypair is generated and published.
This keypair is used to protect the contract and uniquely iden-
tify it. Examples of other projects which develop confidential
and public smart contract platforms include OASIS4, TEEX5,
and Enigma6.
4https://www.oasislabs.com/
5https://teex.io/
6https://www.enigma.co/
In this work, due to the practical reasons, we instantiate
PDIDs with a platform that bases on the TEE assumption, how-
ever, with the continuing progress of platforms basing upon
cryptographic assumptions, we do not see major obstacles in
implementing PDIDs with such a platform. We assume that
the platform exposes public keys (e.g., as described previously)
which allow users to interact with platform contracts confiden-
tially, by sending encrypted transactions. We do not assume a
specific consensus protocol, but we require that the platform
allows to generate inclusion proofs for appended transactions.
In platforms leveraging a traditional Byzantine consensus, such
a proof can be expressed as a multisignature of f + 1 nodes
(where f is the maximum number of malicious nodes7), while
in longest-chain protocols it is usually a Merkle path proof,
rooted in a block belonging to the longest-chain.
III. PASSWORD-AUTHENTICATED DECENTRALIZED
IDENTITIES
In this section, we present PDIDs. We start with the
problem formulation (Section III-A), then we give intuitions
and design rationale behind our framework (Section III-B),
followed by design details (Section III-C), and a discussion
on PDIDs management (Section III-D).
A. Problem Formulation
Our goal is to propose a user identity and authentication
framework. Although we present our system in the client-
server model where only users are authenticated, it can be
adjusted to other models and authentication scenarios (e.g.,
mutual authentication).8 We introduce the following parties
User is a human being that wishes to use a service that
requires authentication. The user inputs the service name
S, as well as its username and password credentials
〈U, pwd〉, used for his authentication. The user operates
its client software to execute the actual authentication
protocol. For a simple description, we represent the user
and his client software as a single entity (i.e., user).
Server represents the service the user wants to use and which
requires authentication. The server participates in the
authentication protocol with the user and aims to verify
the user’s credentials (i.e., whether the user is an owner
of the identity he claims).
We assume that the protocol parties have access to a blockchain
platform with confidential smart contracts (see Section II-C).
For our framework, we seek the following properties.
Human-meaningful Names: identifiers should be memorable
by human beings, such that users do not any need special
infrastructures or devices to remember them. Ideally, they
are user-selected usernames.
Global Namespace: identifiers should resolve to the same
identity no matter when and where they are being re-
solved. This property guarantees that identities can be
used universally.
7The standard security assumption for distributed consensus is that to
tolerate f malicious nodes, the total number of nodes has to be at least 3f+1.
8In practice, thanks to the increasing HTTPS adoption, TLS authentication
of servers have become a de facto standard in recent years.
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(Collision-)Secure Names: identities cannot be impersonated
by forging identifiers (e.g., by hijacking or creating a
new identity with the same identifier). In practice, this
property requires that there is no trusted authority(ies)
privileged to manage identities. For instance, in authority-
based PKIs, an authority can simply impersonate an
identity by creating a malicious certificate claiming the
same identifier, while in OpenID the identity provider can
freely modify or use stored user records.
Memorable Secrets: users can use memorable secrets (i.e.,
passwords) for authenticating their identities. This prop-
erty is desired due to the popularity and advantages of
passwords in user authentication. It also enables to design
an identity system which is seamless to end-users.
Secure Authentication: the user authentication process
should not reveal, even to the verifying server, the user’s
password or any information allowing to run offline
dictionary attacks against the password.
The first three properties constitute Zooko’s triangle. Al-
though some PKI systems refute the trilemma (that no sys-
tem can achieve these three properties simultaneously), they
operate on public-private keypairs. This may be acceptable
for servers able to manage their keys and certificates, but it
may be too demanding for users who prefer to authenticate
using username-password pairs. Therefore, we introduce the
fourth requirement on memorable secrets that also allows to
eliminate user-side changes (since the users can still operate
with username-password pairs, as today). Furthermore, we
require secure authentication, what for our aimed universal
authentication system also extends to servers which should not
be able to learn (even via offline attacks) users’ passwords. We
also require that the system is efficient (i.e., does not introduce
prohibitive overheads), and keeps the users’ privacy on the
same (or a similar) level as in today’s authentication.
We assume an adversary whose goal is to authenticate on
behalf of the user or to learn the user’s password. We assume
that the adversary cannot compromise users’ passwords, the
used cryptographic primitives and protocols, and the deployed
blockchain platform. The adversary can compromise a server
which the user authenticates to, and in this case, the adversary
aims to attack the user’s password. We require that the system
not only protects from revealing users’ passwords but in
particular, should not reveal to the adversary any information
which would enable her to run offline attacks on passwords.
We require that the smart contract execution and the consensus
protocol are secure, although we assume that the adversary
can compromise up to a tolerable number of blockchain nodes
(e.g., up to 1/3 of all nodes in Byzantine consensus). We
assume that the adversary operating such a compromised node
may be interested in attacking the system properties (e.g.,
attempting to run offline attacks). Side channel attacks, like
timing, power, or cache attacks, are out of scope of our
adversary model.
B. Intuitions and Design Rationale
Designing an identity framework with the stated properties
is challenging. Systems that attempt to solve the trilemma,
usually, propose a PKI variant, where bindings between user-
selected names and public keys are recorded on a public
distributed ledger (the append-only ledger and a large-scale
User
Server
GPM1) Registration (U
, pwd)
alice: pwd1
bob: pwd2
charlie: pwd3
…
2a) Password authentication (U, pwd)
2b) Is (U, pwd)
valid?
Fig. 1. A high-level overview of the naive approach.
consensus guarantee that the names are unique and secure).
Such a design is seemingly contradicting when applied to a
password system. Obviously, passwords or even their salted
hashes cannot be stored publicly, but on the other hand, human-
meaningful names to be collision-secure seem to require some
kind of ‘global coordination’. To illustrate our design process
better, in this section, we present a naive approach to the
problem, discuss its drawbacks, and ways of improving it.
We start with a sketch of a simple and naive protocol
whose high level description is presented in Figure 1. In
this protocol, we introduce a trusted and highly available
entity called the Global Password Manager (GPM). The GPM
is responsible for handling identity registrations, keeping all
username and password pairs, and for assisting servers with
user authentication requests. The protocol consists of two
following phases.
1) To participate in the protocol, the user selects its username
and password and registers this pair with the GPM,9
which verifies the registration request and saves the
credentials in its database. The registration step is one-
time per identity.
2) After the identity is established, the user can use it for
authentication, using the two step protocol:
a) To authenticate, the user sends its credentials to a
targeted server.
b) The server, to verify whether the credentials are valid,
contacts the GPM with the authentication request. The
GPM checks whether the username-password pair is
recorded in its database and notifies the server about
the outcome. Depending on the outcome, the server
either successfully authenticates the user or terminates
the protocol.
With our assumption about the GPM, the protocol satisfies
some of our challenging requirements. With a single trusted
GPM who manages its local credentials database, the protocol
guarantees that identities are global and unique (i.e., the GPM
makes sure that no username is equivocated or manipulated).
Moreover, the credentials are universal, since a user registering
once with the GPM, can use its username and password to
9We assume that the parties exchange their messages using a secure channel
although it is not important for our discussion.
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Fig. 2. A high-level overview of the PDID framework.
authenticate with any server supporting the protocol. Further-
more, the GPM keeps user records private. Unfortunately, such
a simple approach has two following fundamental issues
1) the GPM is highly centralized and trusted, and
2) the authentication process is insecure.
Below we discuss how we aim to address those limitations in
our improved design.
Firstly, realizing such a trustworthy centralized GPM would
be difficult in practice. Centralized systems are single points
of failures (in terms of security, privacy, and availability),
introduce higher censorship risks, and can be manipulated
easier. These limitations make a centralized GPM an unaccept-
able design, especially in the context of universal and global
identities. Therefore, one of our design decision is to imple-
ment the GPM’s functionality as a confidential smart contract
(see Section II-C) executed over a decentralized blockchain
platform. In such a setting, the GPM is replaced by a smart
contract, keeping and managing credentials according to the
rules specified by the code. The system would also benefit
from the blockchain properties, providing verifiability and
distributed control (mitigating censorship), while keeping the
state and the execution of the GPM smart contract confidential.
Another major drawback of the naive protocol is that
the server learns the user’s credentials. This limitation is
quite standard in centralized identity systems (where a user
and server share user’s effective password). However, with
decentralized identities, intended to be used universally, it
is unacceptable, since otherwise, only one malicious server
could compromise universal credentials which could be used
for authentication to any other servers. Therefore, our goal is
to realize the authentication process, such that the user can
authenticate to any server, but without revealing to the server
any information about the password. Specifically, we do not
want to reveal any information that would allow the server
to conduct offline password attacks.10 In order to realize this
functionality, we extend a PAKE protocol, specifically, the
OPAQUE protocol (see Section II-B), to the three-party setting,
where the protocol is run between the user, the server, and the
GPM.
10For instance, revealing a password hash allows to run offline attacks.
C. Details
In Figure 2, we show a high-level overview of our frame-
work instantiated with a TEE-based blockchain platform offer-
ing confidential smart contracts. The GPM is implemented as a
smart contract with the encrypted state which can be accessed
and modified only by trusted enclaves. A GPM instance is
created before the protocol’s deployment, and on its creation,
the instance is assigned with a unique blockchain’s public-
private keypair (see details in Section II-C), denoted in our
description as
〈pkb, skb〉. (2)
Interactions with the GPM are conducted via transactions
that are sent to (untrusted) blockchain nodes running (trusted)
enclaves that execute the GPM’s code. The confidentiality of
these transactions is protected by public-key encryption using
the public key of the GPM instance (i.e., pkb), and users and
servers are preloaded with this key. The GPM consists of two
main methods, for PDID registration and authentication, and
the users[] dictionary which maps usernames to their password
metadata (the dictionary is empty upon the contract creation).
In the following, we describe the registration and authen-
tication procedures. For a simple description, in our protocols
and pseudocodes, we omit some basic sanity checks like
parsing, checking whether received elements belong to the
group G, or decryption failures. We emphasize, however, that
if an error occurs at one of those, the party should terminate
the protocol in the failure mode.
1) Registration: To participate in the system, a user needs
to register its identity (i.e., PDID) with the GPM. The
registration process is depicted in Figure 3. First, the user
prepares the password metadata which is computed using his
password pwd. In the OPAQUE protocol (see Section II-B), the
metadata m is computed as shown in Figure 3, using OPRF
(see Equation 1), modular exponentiations of secret values,
and authenticated encryption. More specifically, the password
metadata m is the following tuple
〈ks, ps, Ps, Pu, c〉. (3)
Originally, in OPAQUE, this phase is run by an entity storing
the password metadata (the GPM in our case). In the PDID
framework, it is generated on the user’s side since
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ks
R←− Zq; k ← Fks(pwd)
ps
R←− Zq;Ps ← gps
pu
R←− Zq;Pu ← gpu
c← AEnck(pu, Pu, Ps)
m← 〈ks, ps, Ps, Pu, c〉
c˜← PEncpkb(U,m)
c˜−−−−−−−→
// call NewPDID(c˜)
〈U,m〉 ← PDecskb(c˜)
assert users[U ] == ⊥
users[U ]← m
Fig. 3. The PDID registration process, where the user inputs its username
U and password pwd, and pkb is the blockchain’s public key.
• the process requires a good source of entropy while smart
contracts, being fully deterministic, cannot provide strong
secret randomness themselves,
• similarly, TEEs able to provide randomness, like Intel
SGX, have been demonstrated to do it unreliably [5], and
• in this setting, only the user knows the password pwd,
thus, even in the case of a catastrophic attack (like
compromised skb), the adversary would learn the only
one-way transformation of the password and not pwd
itself,
• the complexity of the GPM’s code is minimized.
After the metadata m is created, it is accompanied with
the username U , encrypted under the blockchain public key
pkb as the ciphertext c˜, and sent to the blockchain platform as
a transaction triggering the registration method of the GPM.
After the transaction is appended to the ledger, a blockchain
node, noticing the request, restores the GPM’s code and state,
and calls its NewPDID() method. As presented in Figure 3,
the code first ensures that the username U is not registered yet
and then assigns the password metadata to the username in the
users[] dictionary. At this point, the user’s PDID is established
and ready for being used in the authentication process. (We
note that even though the GPM’s state is encrypted, storing
the password metadata instead of plain passwords, gives an
additional level of security, since even with a catastrophic
event, like compromised skb or the GPM, the adversary still
needs to run dictionary attacks again every single password.)
2) Authentication: After a PDID is registered, the user
should be able to use its credentials. We require that
• the user is able to use its credentials 〈U, pwd〉 to authen-
ticate to any server (supporting the scheme),
• the server is able to verify that the user knows the
password corresponding to its claimed identity U ,
• the server does not learn the password pwd nor any
information enabling offline dictionary attacks against the
password.
The last two requirements may seem contradicting since
the server needs to verify the identity without possessing its
corresponding password metadata. In the PDID framework,
servers indeed do not store password metadata, which instead
is stored only as part of the GPM’s confidential state. Then, in
order to satisfy these requirements, we extend the OPAQUE
authentication protocol to the three-party setting, where the
GPM’s trusted code assists the server in verifying the user’s
credentials. When abstracting the server and the GPM as a
single entity, they essentially execute the server’s side of the
OPAQUE authentication, however, since the server alone does
not have any password-related information it has to commu-
nicate with the GPM. The details of the PDID authentication
process are presented in Figure 4 and its steps are described
in the following.
1) The protocol is initiated by the user who computes, as in
OPAQUE, his contributions α and Xu to the authenticated
key exchange protocol. Next, the user sends the username
U together with α and Xu to the server.
2) The server first generates its contribution Xs = gxs to
the key exchange. For similar reasons (i.e., a lack of
reliable randomness on smart contracts and minimizing
the complexity of the GPM), as in the registration, this
step is conducted by the server and not by the GPM. Next,
the server computes the session-unique values eu and es,
which will be used in the HMQV key agreement. Then
the server generates a public-private keypair 〈pks, sks〉
that binds the server-GPM communication to the current
session and which will be used by the GPM to contact
the server back securely and without revealing the server’s
identity. Finally, the server encrypts (with pkb) its trans-
action containing the user’s input (U , α, and Xu), the
server’s key exchange contributions (Xs, xs, eu, and es),
as well as its name S and the ephemeral public key pks.
The encrypted transaction c¯ is submitted to the blockchain
platform.
3) The transaction, after being appended to the ledger, trig-
gers the AuthPDID() method of the GPM, which is
executed by a blockchain node within its secure enclave
as follows
a) first, it calls the TxIncluded(c¯) method. This
procedure ensures that the transaction c¯ is already
appended in the blockchain (this check is blockchain-
and consensus-specific – see Section II-C). The purpose
of this check is to eliminate offline attacks, where
a malicious blockchain node would interact with its
enclave undetectably offline trying to generate different
versions of c¯ for different potential passwords (see
Lemma 4 in Section IV-C for more details).
b) Next, the method decrypts the ciphertext c¯, identifies
the user, and restores his password metadata.
c) Then, the method continues the OPAQUE protocol,
computing β from user-provided α and restored ks.
(The β values will allow the user to restore the key k
which was used for encrypting the metadata’s cipher-
text c.)
d) OPAQUE’s final phase is to derive a symmetric key
that will be shared between the server and the user.
To accomplish it, OPAQUE can be combined with
different key exchange methods, but in our system, we
combine it with the method it uses by default, i.e.,
the HMQV protocol. Therefore, the GPM computes
(XuP
eu
u )
xs+esps and hashes it into a key K.
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User Server GPM
r
R←− Zq;α← (H′(pwd))r
xu ← Zq;Xu ← gxu
U,α,Xu−−−−−−−→
xs
R←− Zq;Xs ← gxs ; eu ← H(Xs, U)
es ← H(Xu, S); 〈pks, sks〉 ← Gen()
c¯← PEncpkb(U,α,Xu, xs, eu, es, pks)
c¯−−−−−−−→
// call AuthPDID(c¯)
assert TxIncluded(c¯)
〈U,α,Xu, xs, eu, es, pks〉 ← PDecskb(c¯)
assert users[U ] 6= ⊥
〈ks, ps, Ps, Pu, c〉 ← users[U ]
β ← αks ;K ← H((XuP euu )xs+esps)
SK ← fK(0); cˆ← PEncpks(β, c, SK)
cˆ←−−−−−−−
〈β, c, SK〉 ← PDecsks(cˆ)
β,Xs, c←−−−−−−−
k ← H(pwd, β1/r)
〈pu, Pu, Ps〉 ← ADeck(c)
eu ← H(Xs, U)
es ← H(Xu, S)
K ← H((XsP ess )xu+eupu)
SK ← fK(0)
Fig. 4. The PDID authentication process, where S is the server’s identity (usually, a domain name).
e) The AuthPDID() ends its execution by deriving
(from K) the shared session key SK, which together
with the values β and c is encrypted under pks as the
ciphertext cˆ and sent back to the server.
4) The server decrypts the message, saves SK, and passes
β,Xs, c to the user, to enable him to obtain the same
shared key SK.
5) After receiving these values, the user continues the pro-
tocol by computing β1/r (which equals (H′(pwd))ks ),
which hashed with the user’s password pwd generates the
key k under which the metadata’s ciphertext c is encrypted
(see Figure 3). After decrypting c, the user finishes the
protocol by computing (XsP ess )
xu+eupu and eventually
SK.
The protocol finishes with the parties obtaining the same
shared key SK, which, in addition to authentication, can
be used for protecting their subsequent communication. To
authenticate, the user can simply use SK to (encrypt and)
authenticate the exchanged messages together with the first
application-layer data.
D. Discussion on PDID Management
PDIDs, being password-authenticated identities, share mul-
tiple similarities with password management. However, the
decentralization brings to PDIDs some inherent and interesting
limitations which have not been investigated in the context of
password-based credentials (up to our best knowledge, PDIDs
is the first system of this class). These limitations are generic
and are mainly due to a lack of out-of-band mechanisms which
in traditional authentication systems allow users to recover
or change their passwords (like customer support or e-mail
recovery). With PDIDs, all password-related rules and policies
have to be encoded in the GPM’s code, which introduces
multiple trade-offs.
For instance, password updates can be implemented with
PDIDs as sketched here. For a new password pwd′, the user
could generate its new metadata
m′ = 〈k′s, p′s, P ′s, P ′u, c′〉,
and send it together with its username and the old password
in an encrypted transaction:11
PEncpkb(U, pwd,m
′).
11If desired, sending the old password could be avoided. The user and the
GPM could run the authentication process instead, after which the user would
send a termination request encrypted with the computed session key. That
would, however, impose more complexity in the GPM’s code and, potentially,
require strong randomness from the GPM. (In fact, such a technique could be
used for the PDID registration too.)
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That would trigger a GPM’s password update method, which
would restore the ‘old’ metadata and verify if the sent pass-
word matches it by computing and checking the following
k ← Fks(pwd); 〈pu, Pu, Ps〉 ?= ADeck(c); gpu ?= Pu.
If so, the method would update the GPM’s state by the new
metadata as
users[U ]← m′.
(Additionally, the authentication method AuthPDID() would
need to ensure that the authentication is conducted using the
current password.)
Such a password update procedure, however, would intro-
duce a risk that in the case of a password compromise, the
adversary could hijack the identity permanently (by simply
changing the password). Therefore, password-authenticated
decentralized identities may require alternative management
practices. For instance, a mechanism of identity termination,
when a user wishes to permanently invalidate its (e.g., com-
promised) identity, seems to be more appropriate in some sce-
narios. Other mechanisms easily implementable with PDIDs
include establishing a secondary password for password re-
covery/update. All these mechanisms could be implemented in
a similar way as the password update mechanism. Similarly,
PDIDs could be integrated with some second-factor authenti-
cators, that could be established together with user identities.
We leave details of these constructions and their analysis as
future work, however.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the security of our framework.
We start with showing the properties of its namespace (Sec-
tion IV-A), then we discuss the authentication security (Sec-
tion IV-B), offline attacks (Section IV-C), and lastly, we discuss
online attacks (Section IV-D) and the privacy (Section IV-E).
A. Global and Collision-secure Names
We require that the identity system provides global and
collision secure names. In this section, we show that PDIDs
provide those properties, assuming a secure blockchain plat-
form.
Theorem 1. PDIDs provide global and collision-secure
namespace.
Proof (sketch): Since we assumed that the blockchain
platform deployed is secure, the GPM’s state, at any point in
time, has one canonical view which is consistent with all pre-
vious views. This guarantees, that the namespace consisting of
identifiers recorded in the GPM’s users[] dictionary represents
a global view of all usernames.
The blockchain-platform assumption also implies that the
transactions are processed by nodes correctly, i.e., the GPM’s
state can only be changed by secure enclaves processing trans-
actions whose order is agreed on with the underlying consensus
algorithm. Given that, it is easy to show that the namespace is
collision-secure since if there are two conflicting transactions,
trying to register the same name U , the latter (according to
their execution order in the ledger) will inevitably fail, as the
enclave code processing it will not continue the NewPDID()
method (see Figure 3), after executing the following assertion
assert users[U ] == ⊥.
B. Authentication
Another stated requirement is the security of the authentica-
tion process. This section argues that our framework provides
secure authentication for PDIDs.
Lemma 1. No adversary can authenticate on behalf of the
user U without knowing the corresponding password pwd.
Proof (sketch): An adversary, without knowing the user’s
password, can authenticate as the user only if one of the
following occurs
1) the adversary can impersonate the user’s identity U ,
registering and authenticating with a new 〈U, pwd′〉 pair,
2) the adversary can compute a correct session key.
As we show in Theorem 1, the identities are global
and unique, thus the adversary cannot impersonate the user
registering another username-password pair, contradicting the
first option. Therefore, the only way to authenticate on behalf
of the user is to obtain a correct session key shared with the
server. This option, however, can be eliminated by showing that
with our assumptions, the authentication phase can be reduced
to the OPAQUE protocol and benefit from its properties (as
we show in Lemma 2).
C. Offline Attacks
Beside preventing PDID’s impersonation, our framework
aims at limiting offline dictionary attacks, where an adversary
can gather information allowing her to check whether the used
password is in a dictionary. In this section, we show that PDIDs
prevent such attacks.
Lemma 2. No passive adversary can learn the user’s pass-
word pwd or launch a successful offline attack against pwd.
Proof (sketch): To prove this lemma, we show that
our construction can be reduced to the combination of the
OPAQUE and HMQV protocols, for which security proofs are
presented in their respective papers [30], [35].
In our construction (see Figure 4), the server and the GPM
together execute the OPAQUE’s server-side authentication
logic. Since the GPM’s execution is confidential, the adversary
learns only two additional messages (when compared with the
original OPAQUE execution), exchanged between the server
and the GPM:
c¯← PEncpkb(U,α,Xu, xs, eu, es, pks),
and
cˆ← PEncpks(β, c, SK).
As the adversary cannot compromise the underlying cryp-
tographic primitives, the corresponding secret keys skb and
sks
12, and the blockchain platform, she is unable to learn
12We recall that 〈pks, sks〉 is a fresh ephemeral keypair.
8
anything more than from the original OPAQUE’s execution.
A malicious server can be seen as a more interesting case.
Such a server does not have an interest in compromising the
session key (since it knows it already), but may be interested in
learning passwords of users authenticating with it. Below we
argue that such a server cannot learn any information allowing
to launch even offline password attacks.
Lemma 3. No adversary able to compromise a server can
learn the user’s password pwd or launch a successful offline
attack against pwd.
Proof (sketch): During the execution of the protocol
(see Figure 4), an adversary controlling the server learns
the user’s input U,α,Xu and can freely control values
U,α,Xu, xs, eu, es, pks passed to the GPM. The adversary
learns GPM’s output β, c, SK, and the goal of the adversary
is to find the password pwd or any information allowing for
offline attacks against pwd.
According to the registration and authentication protocols,
the knowledge of ks is necessary to run offline attacks against
pwd. With ks the adversary could try to keep generating
different symmetric keys k′ from potential passwords pwd′:
k′ ← Fks(pwd′),
and keep testing them against the known ciphertext c, which
is computed as
AEnck(pu, Pu, Ps).
However, ks is a high-entropy secret which is not revealed
to the adversary. The adversary can interact with the GPM,
passing different α′ values and obtaining
β′ ← α′ks ,
but if this interaction would allow the adversary to learn ks,
or even to compute α′ks for any non-queried α′, that would
be equivalent with breaking the One-More Diffie-Hellman
problem (assumed to be hard by the OPAQUE protocol),
contradicting our assumptions.
Similarly, it is easy to show that such an adversary cannot
learn any value of the password metadata (pu, Pu, Ps), and
subsequently, cannot learn a session key SK for any authen-
tication that she does not participate in.
Although we assume that the blockchain platform is secure,
a tolerable number of individual nodes (usually, up to 1/3 of
all nodes) can be compromised. Then, a particularly interesting
case is when a malicious node operator interacts with the
secure enclave it runs. Such an operator, cannot read the
enclave’s memory or influence its execution steps but can
interact with it offline. In particular, the node can emulate
the user-server interaction (see Figure 4) trying multiple pass-
words, calling the GPM’s AuthPDID() method locally, and
checking whether the user’s session key and the key outputted
by the enclave match. We show that the PDID framework
eliminates such attacks.
Lemma 4. An adversary able to compromise a tolerable
number of blockchain nodes cannot launch a successful offline
dictionary attack against the user’s password pwd.
Proof (sketch): To prove this property, we show from the
GPM’s construction, that its AuthPDID() method computes
a shared secret key only for a transaction that was already
added to the blockchain.
In our construction, we use a technique similar to the one
presented by Kaptchuk et al. [32], where upon receiving a
transaction c¯, its processing method AuthPDID() first calls
assert TxIncluded(c¯),
which guarantees that the transaction is already part of the
ledger. Since the adversary, even compromising a tolerable
number of nodes, is not able to compromise the properties
of the blockchain platform, she is not able to overcome this
assertion with any transaction that is not appended to the
blockchain.
With this check, the adversary controlling a compromised
node and interacting with its trusted enclave offline, cannot
emulate the user-server authentication, and to get any GPM’s
output she needs to register the transactions on the blockchain,
making her attack attempts visible to the network (i.e., online).
D. Online Attacks
Online password guessing attacks, where an adversary
interacts with the authentication system trying to guess cor-
rect username-password pairs, is a generic attack against any
password system. The PDID framework is not an exception to
such attacks, and an adversary can just try different password
interacting with supporting servers or with the GPM directly.
A popular way of mitigating such attacks is rate limiting.
Usually, it introduces a trade-off between the security and
availability, and such mitigation would be implementable at
the network-level or within the GPM (e.g., via small state
representing the number of recent authentication attempts).
Moreover, blockchain platforms enable an interesting exten-
sion of this technique (we, however, leave details of such
solutions as future work). Namely, instead of limiting authenti-
cation attempts, after a threshold number of attempts in a time
window, the platform could require a small payment that could
disincentivize potential adversaries from guessing passwords.
E. Privacy
The PDID framework does not introduce any message
flows or mechanisms violating the user’s privacy when com-
pared with the traditional password-based authentication (users
interact only with servers, except for the registration). The mes-
sages exchanged between servers and the GPM are encrypted,
thus do not reveal anything about the authenticating user.
Moreover, the server’s keys used in the GPM-server commu-
nication are ephemeral and unknown to an observer, therefore,
the observer investigating the blockchain logs would not be
able to determine the server’s identity (we do not consider
network-level deanonymization attacks). Finally, all usernames
are stored as part of the encrypted state and processed only
by trusted enclaves confidentially, thus enumerating usernames
just by looking at the blockchain content is impossible.13
13For instance, an adversary could try to register every possible username to
learn which are registered already. This approach, however, could be mitigated
by means discussed in Section IV-D.
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TABLE I. PERFORMANCE OF THE PDID OPERATIONS (IN MILLISECONDS).
 
Registration
Authentication
Total Phase I Phase II
min max avg med min max avg med min max avg med min max avg med
User 7.25 14.00 7.45 7.36 10.36 16.18 10.58 10.52 5.71 10.90 5.88 5.84 4.60 6.75 4.71 4.68
Server N/A 1.53 3.75 1.63 1.61 1.47 3.65 1.57 1.55 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.06
GPM 5.94 9.35 6.54 6.48 18.02 22.68 19.00 18.55 N/A N/A
1
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented and evaluated the PDID framework to
prove its feasibility. In this section, we report on our imple-
mentation and present the evaluation of our system.
A. Implementation
We fully implemented the PDID framework and our imple-
mentation consists of a supported user’s client (executing the
user’s logic as in Figure 3 and Figure 4), a server (authenticat-
ing users as in Figure 4), and the GPM handling registrations
and assisting servers in user authentication. The user and
server functionalities are implemented in C. To realize the
GPM, we used a recent Hyperledger Fabric Private Chaincode
(FPC) framework [17] which extends Hyperledger Fabric by
confidential smart contracts. The GPM is implemented in C++
as a smart contract of this platform by using Intel SGX SDK to
run the contract within an enclave. For encryption and hashing,
the user and server implementations use the NaCl library [9],
while for implementing these operations in the GPM we
used the TweetNaCl library [10] (a more portable version of
NaCl).14 We use a combination of the Curve25519, Salsa20,
and Poly1305 cryptographic primitives (see details [9]) as
public-key encryption, a combination of Salsa20 and Poly1305
for authenticated encryption, and SHA-512 as a hash function.
We implemented the modified OPAQUE and HMQV protocols
with elliptic curve cryptography for the group operations.
Our implementation bases upon and extends the Easy-ECC
library15 and we used the secp256r1 curve by default. Our
code is publicly available at https://github.com/pszal/pdid.
B. Evaluation
To evaluate our PDID implementation we conducted a
series of experiments. First, we evaluated computational over-
heads introduced by the PDID framework. We set up an
FPC testbed and executed full PDID registration and authen-
tication operations for 1 000 times each. In every run, we
measured the time required to complete different protocol
steps. To measure execution times, we used a commodity
laptop equipped with SGX-enabled Intel i7-7600U (2.80GHz)
CPU, 8GB of RAM, and run under Linux. In our experiments,
we used a conservative setting where we measured the compu-
tational overhead of specific procedures executed sequentially
on ‘fresh’ registration and authentication requests. We did
not use any caching strategies, parallelization, sophisticated
14We emphasize that the GPM’s code is executed within an SGX enclave
which cannot use standard system libraries.
15https://github.com/esxgx/easy-ecc
parametrization, or request/transaction batching, which would
amortize the execution time, although we see these techniques
as desired in a deployment-ready implementation. The results
of our experiments are presented in Table I, where we report
total execution times as well as execution times for different
authentication phases (see details in Figure 4). By user’s ‘Phase
I’ of the authentication, we denote the operations with which
the user initiates the protocol until the first message is sent
to the server. Authentication’s ‘Phase I’ on the server side
starts when the server receives this message and lasts until
the ciphertext c¯ is generated, while the server’s ‘Phase II’ is
between receiving cˆ and sending the last protocol’s message.
The steps executed by the user after he receives the last
message are denoted as ‘Phase II’ of the user’s authentication.
As presented, even with our unoptimized implementation
executed on a single core of the commodity machine, PDIDs
introduce small computational overhead. The registration on
the user side requires around 7ms on average, while the
authentication process takes in total around 10ms on average.
This overhead is comparable with client-side TLS verifications.
Furthermore, during the authentication, the user needs to
keep only a 97B-long state. More importantly, the server-side
authentication is even faster, requiring in total only 1.63ms
per authentication (on average), dominated by its first phase.
It allows a server to conduct around 613 authentications per
second. A server needs to store only a short state per each
authentication (i.e., 64B-long ephemeral secret key sks).
The throughput of the GPM depends not only on contract
execution times but mainly on the consensus layer where
blockchain nodes run an actual consensus protocol to agree
on the transaction order. To improve performance and allow
higher flexibility, Hyperledger Fabric separates these two lay-
ers, with distinct node functions responsible for ordering and
executing transactions. Given that, the performance of the
PDID framework is bounded by the consensus layer (since
only once transactions are ordered they can be executed).
Fortunately, the performance of this layer has been exten-
sively investigated in previous studies, and even in large-
scale distributed deployments, a Hyperledger Fabric network
yields throughput between 2 000 and 3 000 transactions per
second [4], introducing the end-to-end latency between 500
and 800 ms, respectively.16
The GPM’s NewPDID() code, executed within an SGX
16Our protocol introduces small transmission overhead with the message
sizes are between 74B and 300B. The end-to-end latency, in our cases, is
introduced by the server-GPM communication, also mainly depends on the
consensus layer and network conditions of the blockchain platform.
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enclave, handles a PDID registration in around 6.54ms on
average. Therefore, a single core executing the GPM’s regis-
tration can handle around 153 registrations per second (around
0.55 million per hour). This throughput seems to be sufficient
to handle even a global-scale registration load using only a
single core. Each registered PDID requires only 260B (for the
password metadata) in the GPM’s contract state. Due to the
elliptic curve operations required, the authentication operation
on the GPM is relatively slower, requiring 19.00ms on average,
which yields the throughput of around 52 authentications per
second on a single core. To shed a light on this number, we
refer to Thomas et al. [56] who report that for 670 000 users,
Google has experienced 21 million authentication events for 28
days in early 2019. This averages as 8.68 authentications per
second, but they also report on a peak of 2 192 authentications
per 100 seconds (i.e., around 22 authentications per second).
Approximating their results, a single core executing GPM’s
AuthPDID() is able to handle around 1.58 million users
with their authentications in the peak and around 4 million
for the averaged load. We emphasize, that this throughput can
be scaled horizontally (to the limits of the consensus layer),
and for instance, 38 nodes (assuming ideal load balancing)
would be able to saturate the consensus layer throughput at
2 000 authentications per second. There are possible further
performance improvements, including more performant GPM
implementation or scalability solutions (like sharding) of the
platform itself.
VI. RELATED WORK
The subject of identity and naming infrastructures has been
extensively investigated over the last decades. In this section,
we discuss and compare only with the most related work.
A. Password-authenticated Identities
Username and password pairs are arguably the most
popular credentials for user authentication [13]. Users us-
ing password-authenticated identities, typically, establish their
identities with a server first and then use these identities to
access the server (as described in Section II-B). Typically,
the identity is expressed as a user-selected username (i.e.,
login) which is local to the server and cannot be used for
authenticating to other servers. To make such ‘local’ logins
more universal and useful, decentralized authentication and
authorization protocols were proposed [26], [46]. For instance,
with OpenID [46] users can use their identities, usually ex-
pressed as e-mail addresses, registered with a single high-
profile service (called an identity provider) to access other
servers with no need of creating a new dedicated identity for
them. In these systems, to authenticate with a relying server,
a user authenticates to its identity providers (usually with a
username-password pair) which in turn asserts the identity’s
validity to the relying server (who trusts the identity provider
in that scope).
Password-authenticated identities provide critical advan-
tages, contributing to their surprising domination over seem-
ingly superior alternatives [12]. Firstly, these identities can
typically be expressed as human-meaningful names, limiting
the need of additional devices or infrastructures for storing
or processing them. Secondly, passwords, broadly consid-
ered as memorable secrets, significantly simplify the secret
managements (especially, on the user’s side). Lastly, they
have a particularly long history as authentication means, thus
they typically do not introduce any adoption or operation
overheads, both for users and server operators. They come with
some limitations, however. The main drawback of traditional
password-authenticated identities is that the user is not con-
trolling its identity and a malicious server could impersonate
or terminate any identities at its will. In fact, not only servers
have to be trusted. For example, identities expressed with e-
mail addresses rely on DNS which is hierarchical by design,
thus for resolving a domain name a trust placed in its operator
(as well as, in all operators of all upper-domains) is required.17
OpenID, although convenient, enables identity providers to
learn what servers (and when) users contact. Lastly, most
of these schemes use the standard insecure authentication
(discussed in Section II-B). PDIDs eliminate these drawbacks,
enabling decentralized and self-sovereign identities, at the
same time providing the advantages of user-password pairs
with secure authentication.
B. Public-Key-authenticated Identities
Schemes that rely on public-key cryptography for authen-
tication constitute another popular class of identity systems.
Unlike password-authenticated identities, all systems described
in this section require users to establish and manage public-
private keypairs. Although it may provide security benefits
(e.g., facilitating secure authentication protocols) and enable
new applications (like digital signatures), in practice, the
public-private keypair management has been proved to be a
challenging task, not only for users but even for allegedly more
tech-savvy server operators [36].
1) Certificate-based: Authority-based public-key infras-
tructures (PKIs), like X.509 PKI [19], are designed to manage
mappings between identities and their public keys. Typically,
they introduce certification authorities (CAs) that are trusted
parties verifying bindings between identities and their claimed
public keys, and asserting this fact in signed digital certificates.
X.509 is prominently used together with TLS for authenti-
cating web services (identified by domain names), however,
it is also adopted for user authentication [45]. In this case,
users are issued with digital certificates, certifying that their
identities (expressed by full names and/or e-mail addresses)
are associated with their public keys. These PKIs require trust
in CAs, which usually trust DNS for identity verification.
The required trust is a major weakness of those systems
and there have been multiple real-world attacks on CAs
reported to date [38]. Although many recent approaches try to
improve these PKIs, they usually target CAs’ accountability,
transparency, and attack detection [6], [37], [42], [50], [54],
but without changing the fundamental trust assumptions about
CAs.
Relaxing the assumption of trusted authorities is a design
goal of decentralized PKIs, where no trusted party is needed
to verify identities, which in turn, are verified and asserted
by other system participants. In those systems, trust decisions
are made solely by users, depending on their trust estimation
of the quality and length of ‘trust chains’. Trust relations in
17For instance, a user with the e-mail identity user@domain.ac.uk, not
only trusts domain.ac.uk, but the entire DNS hierarchy (i.e., ac.uk, uk,
and the root).
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TABLE II. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SCHEMES IN TERMS OF THE DESIRED PROPERTIES.
PDID Logins OpenID Authority-based PKIs
PGP’s  
Web of Trust
SDSI/SPKI-like 
PKIs
Self-certifying 
IDs Petnames
Identity-based 
Cryptography
Blockchain-
based PKIs
Global Namespace ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔
Human-meaningful Names ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔
Collision-secure Names ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔
Secure Authentication ✔ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Memorable Secrets ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘
those PKIs form so called web-of-trust and this model was
prominently proposed in PGP [1] for securing e-mails (which
still rely on the DNS hierarchy). SDSI/SPKI [22], [48] is a
distributed PKI with local namespaces extending the web-
of-trust paradigm by introducing groups, access control, and
security policies. These systems eliminate trusted parties, but
their namespaces either allow collisions or are local. Moreover,
they require an infrastructure for distributing trust relations.
The GNU Name System [57] proposes such an infrastructure
to be implemented via a distributed hash table.
Petnames [52] is an anti-phishing system where users
themselves can assign local (private) names to keys of parties
they interact with, distrusting names placed in certificates.
The intention of those local names is that, if a certificate for
a lexicographically-similar phishing website is presented, it
will not be trusted by the user by default, since the website
will not have its petname. The system requires users to keep
maintaining correct bindings between petnames and keys,
which in a dynamic or multi-key environment, like the Internet,
can be troublesome and harm the usability of the scheme [23].
2) Certificate-less: Since certificates introduce substantial
overheads and their management poses significant challenges,
especially, for security-unaware users, eliminating digital cer-
tificates was a design goal of certificate-less systems. Self-
certifying identifiers [41] base on the idea of deriving identity
directly from the public-key, usually, by simply hashing it.
Such hash-names are short (20-32 bytes), global and collision-
secure, as their uniqueness is guaranteed by the properties of
the hash function deployed, and users can create them without
interacting with any other party. Self-certifying identities are
deployed, for instance, in the Tor’s hidden service .onion
namespace [55] or in the HIP protocol [43]. Unfortunately,
names in those systems are represented by pseudorandom
strings which, despite being relatively short (20-32 bytes), are
not easily memorable by humans, therefore, these schemes
require dedicated infrastructure for distributing names.
Identity-based cryptography enables to generate public-
private keypairs in a way where private keys are freely selected
by users [51]. Since the public keys can be human-meaningful
identities themselves, these systems do not need certificates
or name discovery infrastructures, while enabling public-key
encryption [11] or signature verification [27], just by inputting
human-friendly identity’s names. The main drawback of these
schemes is that keypairs have to be generated by a trusted
party that learns secret keys. Moreover, when used in the
global environment, these schemes would need some way of
coordination to guarantee unique names.
3) Blockchain-based: Blockchain platforms were early
seen as promising infrastructures for implementing distributed
identities. They provide decentralization, verifiability, trans-
parency, censorships resistance, and they heavily use unique
addresses, i.e., public keys (or their hashes) of participants
which can be used as native identities.
Built upon these observations [53], Namecoin [39] is
a blockchain-based PKI platform allowing users to register
arbitrary identities and associate them with public keys. The
system refutes the Zookoo’s conjecture, providing memoriz-
able names associated with key pairs, without trusted parties.
Despite the low adoption of Namecoin [31], the research com-
munity followed its design, proposing systems with additional
features [3], [24] or extended trust models [2], [21].
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) [47] is an attempt to
unify the management of decentralized digital identities. With
DIDs, users can create their self-sovereign identities (associ-
ating them with their public keys) and anchor them with a
blockchain platform their trust. DIDs are under heavy devel-
opment, and are implemented and experimentally deployed as
part of the Hyperledger project [20].
C. Comparison
In Table II, we show a comparison of different name
systems with ours in terms of the desired properties. For the
row ‘Collision-secure Names’, we put a negative mark, if the
system introduces trusted party(ies) managing user identities.
Systems providing this property differ in assumptions under
which the property is achieved. For instance, self-certifying
identifiers require a collision-resistant hash function which
arguably is a weaker assumption than required by web-of-trust
PKIs (i.e., a trusted ‘fragment’ of a peer-to-peer network) and
blockchain-based solutions requiring that a (super)majority of
all nodes of a Sybil-resistant blockchain network is honest. We
also note that our instantiation of the PDID framework requires
the TEE assumption, although PDIDs can be instantiated
with platforms not requiring TEE (see Section II-C). Our
comparison shows that PDIDs is the only system achieving
all the desired properties.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented PDIDs, a framework providing
password-authenticated decentralized identities with global and
human-meaningful names. Up to our best knowledge, it is
the first system achieving these properties. In our system, a
user registers his username and password-derived information
with a confidential smart contract and then can use these
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credentials to authenticate to any server. For authentication, we
combine our framework with the OPAQUE protocol, resulting
in an authentication system where even the server cannot
learn the user’s password or any information leading to offline
dictionary attacks against it. We report on the implementation
of our system and evaluation results. In the future, we plan
to instantiate PDIDs with a blockchain platform providing
confidential smart contracts without the TEE assumption. We
also plan to investigate PDID management and additional
security features, like detecting credential’s misuse.
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